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AFTER BRUSSILOV CAME THE END
By KLAUS MEHNERT
A ft!:w u'eek8 ago -a Soviet paper ;n Sh(l.l'(Jhai compared tlte offennuu of the
Tsar;st General Br1UIMV witl, those of the Red A'nny durin(J tit;., winter. Indeed.
thtJre are Bitllilaritiu. Taking up the stt{l(Je8tion. we have 8t'udied Bru88ilov'8 offen.
ftVU in the l>glll of our preamt J..-rwwledge. tracing tlteir aftcreffcds down to that day,
er.actly twentyjiw. year8 ago, when. on March 3, /9/8. tJUJ collapse of t~itl gigantic
military muCliilUl of RUS8ia tt'<UI sealed at tiUl confererlGtl table of Brut·LllolJ8k.
No.3
A GREAT TEAM
THE two great offensives connectedwith th na.m of General llruS-...ulov(pronounced with the accent on the
"i1 ) took plo,ce in the summers of 191 t3
and 1917. But in ord r to gmsp their
significance we must turn bri fly to the
first two years of the Great War.
On the eastern front the war had
started'with a Russian offensive. When
in August 1914 the German armies swept
through Belgium and northern France,
urgent calls for aid were sent to Rnssia
by her western allies. In response to
these, two Russian armies, indioated by
black arrows on our map,' invaded East
Pros ill. on August 17 and August 20
respectively. This province had boon
almo t denuded of troops in order to get
every mu,n pas ible for the drive toward
Paris. nly the German Eighth Army
was there. \~ hen its commander in chief
and hi chief of staff lost their nerve,
Generals von Hindenburg and von
Ludendorff were appointed in their place
by the Kaiser on August 22. Together
with Lieut. Colonel (later General) Max
Hoffmann, who had been with the staff
of the Eighth Army before, they formod
the best team of the entire Great War.
One of the Russian armies was annihilated
at Tannenberg, while the other was
driven out of East Pru ill. after suffering
a catastrophe. The cntil'e affair was over
by September 17, Russia having 10 t
almo t two entire armies, about a. quarter
of a million men, and huge amOlffits of
war material.
The Russians had better luck with
their ofJensi,'c in tho south. Their ar-
mies, including one undor General Brus-
ilov, succcoded in Ualicia in throwing
back the Alistro-HlIl1gll.J'il1n forcos against
the mountain wall of tbe CaJ'pathians.
To aid the Austrians, part of the vic-
torious Eighth Army of East Prus ill. was
formed into a new army, the Ninth,
under General von Maekensen which,
with the speed of a flyweight and the
punch of a heavyweight, made rings
around the vastly superior Ru sian forces
in the Polish "panhandle" and later, re-
inforced by troops fro111 the western
front. pushed them almo.. t to the gates
of \\·arsaw.
Then winter came, and the front froze.
During 1914 the Gorman armies in the
east had fought undor fL serious handicap.
Ueneral yon FaLkonhavn. the Cilief of
the German Ueneral •:tafT, had thrown
the woight of his forces westward, for
ho considered the ea tern front to be, for
the time being, only a side ho\\'. As a
I'('sult, tho great triumvirate of Hinden-
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burg, Ludendorfl, and Hoffmann, who
wished to achieve a decision in the east
while fighting the war defensively in the
west, had not enough troops for large-
scale operations. Even so, they had
worked miracles with their few divisions.
THE ADVANCE
1914 had brought no decision in the
west, and the Kaiser was willing to try
the eastern alternative. In January 1915
he decided to send the newly formed
Tenth Army to the east instead of to the
west. One more army, the Eleventh,
was composed of troops withdrawn from
the west and put under Mackensen.
With these forces, 1915 became the year
of the greatest victories in the east for
the Central Powers. In February the
Germans won the winter battle in Masu-
ria, and on May 2 the real show began,
the largest offensive of the entire war.
It started with the brilliant break-
through of Mackensen's Eleventh Army
between Tarnow and Gorlice, the south·
we tern comer of the Russian salient.
The break-through was so complete that
the armies of the Tsar were quiokly
swept from Galicia and Poland. The
Russian soldiers fought bravely and with
their customary endurance; but their
leadership was not in the same class
with the Germans. Most of all the
Russians suffered from the lack of anna-
menta and ammunition and from the
inefficiency of their transportation system.
Hugo areas, including Warsaw and Brest-
Litovsk, were lost. "The whole strategic
apparatus of the Russian defenses, for-
tresscs, railways and river lines had
passed into German hands," was how
Winston Churchill summarized thc re-
Rults of the summer of 1915 (The World
Crisis, Vol.Vl, p.325).
When the front froze for the second
time, it followed the Duena River to
Duenaburg and thence ran due south to
the northern tip of Rumania. 1915 had
cost the Russians one million in killed
and wounded and three quarters of a
million in prisoners. The Tsar took over
personal command, with General Alcxcyev
as the actual head of the staff.
But General Falkenhayn had never had
his heart in the eastern operations. In
1916 he returned to the west. The
wavering and confused attitude of the
German military leadership was a bad
handicap in the conduct of the war. In
contrast to today, the German leaders of
the Great War lacked the complete real-
ization of what it was about and con-
sequently lacked a truly great plan for
victory. They did not lead a "total
war." Falkenhayn now transferred Aalf
a million men from Russia to the French
war theater, and on February 21 he
started his famous attack on Verdun.
Then the Austrians, who were supposed
to remain on the eastern front in full
strength, threw large forces against Italy
in the Trentino offensive starting on
:May 15.
Ever since their disastrous retreats of
1915, the RU88i&n armies had been pre-
paring for a great offensive which was to
start at the end of June 1916. The
Allies sent armaments in large quantities
and huge Russian armies were trained.
By the spring of 1916, according to
German sources, 140 RU88ian divisions
faced 86 German and Austro-Hungarian
divisions.
A 8T 'PENDOUS PLAN
The idea of General AJexeyev for this,
the largest offensive ever planned by the
Tsarist armies, was based on the fact
that the Russians were numerically supe-
rior at any given point. He decided to
attack aU along the front so as not to
give the Central Powers a chance to con-
centrate their forces at any speciall~r
threatened point. As soon as heavy
fighting had broken out along the entire
front and the Germans were unable to
move their forces from one part to the
other, the Russian reserves were to be
thrown in at several places at the same
time, particularly in the area of Krevo,
to break up the German front once and
for all.
This stupendous plan, worthy of an
army which called itself a "steam roller,"
was never fully carried out. The moves
of the German and Austrian armies on
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other theaters of war precipitated events
and upset the time schedule. Again, as
in August 1914, urgent appeals began to
pour into the Russian headquarters.
France was terribly pressed at Verdun
and Italy in the Trentino. The Allies,
to be sure, did not ask for a premature
starting of the general Russian offensive,
but they begged that something be done.
A stream of visitors from Allied countries
proceeded to Russia to plead for aid.
The official Hisfmy of the USSR, published
in Moscow in 1941, aptly summarizes the
events in the spring of 1916:
All this time the AlliN demanded of Ru88ia
more and atill more cannon fodder. In April
UUlI French "lIOCiaiiate" were 8llnt to RU88ia who
eVWIl~ the transfer of 400,000 Ru88ian
eoIdiea to France. (Vol. m, p.1I7.)
The task of relieving the Allies was
given to General Brussilov. He was by
now in charge of one third of the Russian
front, known as the southwestern front,
which extended southward from the
Pripet Marshes. After four days of tre-
mendous artillery preparation he gave
the signal on June 4 for the offensive
which carries his name.
'1'JDI BBUSSILOV OFFENSIVE OF 1916
At fi:l'8t the Brussilov offensive met
with extraordinary success. With the
exception of one German division in Gen-
eralBothmer's anny, Brt188i1ov faced only
divisions of the Austro-Hungarian armies.
Though they included many fine regi-
ments, they had also a large percentage
of soldiers who were of neither Austrian
nor Hungarian origin and who felt no
love for the Hapsburg regime.
On a front of more than 300 kilometers
the lines collapsed under the impact of
B1'U88ilov's armies. Only the center,
composed of Bothmer's and the
Second Hungarian Army, held out
like a rock. The Russian High Com-
mand jubilantly decided to exploit the
unexpected situation. It sent everything
that the railways could carry from other
parts of the front. Their numcrical
superiority was so great that their attacks
set in all along the front. But the center
of gravity was the southwestern front.
In the end, even Bothmer, employing
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elastic defense tactics, decided to yield
Bome ground.
Within one month BrussHov captured
huge booty and many prisoners. The
situation became extremely serious for
the Central Powers. Troops were scraped
together from everywhere and thrown
n.gainst the victorious Russians. The
attacks on Verdun and in the Trentino
were discontinued.
In his book My War Memories 1914/
1918 General Ludendorff fully admits the
gravity of the situation brought about
by Brussilov's offensive. He writes:
We weakened our linN [in the north] to the
utmost in order to _illt the anniN further to the
llOUth.... Our confidence that our troops would
hold their poeitioD8, even if they had only a few
men to do it. W88 unlimited. Our terurion grew
with the progre88 of events . . . . By the beginning
of July a tremendou8 IItruggle w88 going on along
the major part. of the eutern front . . . . Th_
were uncommonly 88rious daytl . . . . The Uennan
troops were exhausted by the cootinUOWl battles
and had to protect extended front8; the Austro-
Hungarian troops had lost all confidence in their
own strength and needed German wpport. every·
whore . . . . The RUMiaDa _re prepariDs for
another gigantic blow, while we continued to shed
our blood at the Somme and the Austro.Hunganan
Anny W88 under IItrong prellllurc at the Italian
front. The atmosphere W88 fiJled with the fore-
bodings of a stonn. our nervC8 were strained to
the utmost. (pp.17tl.178.)
But by the mirlrJle of ,July, superior
leadership, better lines of communica-
tions, more efficient training of the in-
dividual soldier, a.nd stronger equipment,
enabled the Germans to close the danger-
ous gap. The Brussilov offensive con-
tinued to the end of August, but it had
definitely been stemmed.
Falkenhayn's authority did not survive
Brussilov's blow. On August 28, Hinden-
burg and Ludendorff were summoned by
the Kaiser to replace Falkenhayn. Princo
Leopold of Bavaria took Hindenburg's
place as commander in chief of the
eastern front and General Hoffmann
took Ludondorff's as the chief of staff
a.nd master mind of the prince.
CHURCHILL'S VERDICT
What was the result of the tremendous
effort.s of Brussilov's 1916 offensive? We
shall let Brussilov's alli(,s answer this
question.
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Winston Churchill, who is again pnsh-
ing Russian soldiers into their graves for
the sake of the British Empire, has this
to say in his evaluation of the Brussilov
offensive:
As the Gormans gradually arrived upon tho
brokon front, tho RU6llian attacks became iucroo.s·
ingly costly and barron. Nevertheless. thoy were
continued with the rutblo88 prodigality of new
hope • . . . The Russian ~(morllis strove to mllke
flesh nod blood ochievo the PUrp0808 of artillory.
\\'iro entanglements, which thore wero no shells
to Cllt. were traversed upon t.he heaps of dead
which the German mochine·1;UJlS piled upon thorn.
This profusion in the commanders was equalled by
the de\'otion of t.heir troops • . . . The waste of
human life in those unnoticed fields was acarcely
exceeded in any period of the war . . . . This was
the lost effective military operation undertaken by
the 8nniO!l of the Czar. (7'lIe World Cri4i", Vol. 1\',
pp.342.343.)
Liddell Hart, who today is considered
Britain's able t military writer, called the
Brussilo" offensive "the last vital effort
of the Russian army ... which com-
pleted the virtual ruin of Russian military
power." (The Re<zl Irar, pp.220-22I.)
THE ENn OF THE TSAR.
The Swiss historian Hermann Stege-
mann in his monumental Hi8tonJ of tlte
Great War (YoU V, p.304), writes: "Out
of the blood which Brussilov had wasted
in the summer of 1916 germinated the
seed of the revolution." He estimates
the total lossos of Brussilov's thrce-
months' offensive at 1,797,500 soldiers
and 85,980 officers.
These statements were, of course aU
made retrospectively. When the eastern
front froze for the third time in the late
autumn of 1916, Bussia outwardly seemed
better off than the year before. She
had had rcmarkaole ucccss and had,
temporarily gravely endangered the front
of the Central Powers. The world was
so imprc ed by the display of Russian
might that Rumania finally took the
long-postponed step and, on August 27,
1916, declared war on Austria-Hungary.
But oenenth the surface things looked
different. The Russian people were tired
of war, of sacrificcs, of inefficiency and
corruption. After their blind confidence
in the Tsar had been shaken by the
wrrible and vain losses of two years of
fighting, they wanted their voice to be
heard. But, instead, the government be-
came more, rather than less, autocratic.
The Duma, the Russian Parliament, was
adjourned three times during the winter
of 1910/17 in order to silence its voice of
eriticism. When on March 11 it was
even di olved. the storm broke. On
March 15 the Tsar abdicated.
The provisional democratic government
which now took over was determined to
continue the war at the side of its demo-
cratic western allies. Alexander Keren-
sky, Minister of War, became the ehief
exponent of this policy. At the same
time the Allie, panicky with fear over
the possible loss of the Russian cannon
fodner, did their utmost to keep Russia
in the war. :J1'or month Keren ky toured
the Army and u ed his remal'kable ora-
torical talent to rouse its will for con-
tinuing the war. Subordinating every-
thing to this one aim, he unserupulously
employed revolutionary phraseology and
thereby helped to pave the way for
Bolshevi.sm.
THE BRUSSU.OV OFFENSiVE OF 1917
With a strange combination of rev-
olutionary enthusiasm und Russian na-
tionalism, the Russian Army made one
more supreme effort. Again this i linked
with the name of Brussilov, who was
made commander in chief of all the
Rus. ian armies. A narrow stretch, fifty
kilometers wide, near the small town of
Brzezany, in front of the position cap-
tured by the Brussilov offensive of 1916,
was decided upon as tho place for tho
break-through. All the firing power the
Rus ian Army could muster wa a.s-
sembled. The guns stood wheel to(} wheel.
Although tho Central Powers knew of
these prepara.tions, they had only very
weak forces at their disposal there, since
tel'riole battles were raging on tho western
front. But Bothmer was again at his
post.
Once aga.in the ofl'ensivt:' lJega.1l with
artillery preparation It\-. ting ovuml days.
The Rus ian infantry attacked on July l.
With five- and teufold superiority advanc-
ing in denso masses, drivou 0)' Kerensky
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Moscow
The weak Austrian forces were overcome,
and wild enthusiasm swept through Rus-
sia. But this was premature. Ceneral
Bothmer sent his last reserves and, when
the Russians tried to e~1Jloit their break,
they met with German troops who stood
like granite. Again the attack got stuck.
The two Brussilov offensives of 1916 and
1917, and, we might add here, of the
winter 1942/43, have shown that the
Russian Army is capable of very powerful
I Eas~~rn bord~rs of Hl~(~n~ral Powt"rs on August-1.1911j.
NlArva Wintvr Fron~ 1911j./15
. ... Wintvr Front- /9IS//6
1;16rot.nd gaint"d by First-
19 BrussiTov oFf'msiWI
• FarJ-hnt- advanct" oF'
• (~n~ral Pow~r t-roops in
• 19/8
and Brussilov (who were both on the
spot), the Russians ran into the German
and Austro-Hungarian defenses. Again
Bothmer stood like a rock. The Russians
made very small gains, for which they
paid a terrible price. Then they bogged
down.
On July 8 a. second Russian attempt
was made near Halicz, further to the
south. This time the success was greater.
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offensives if its leaders are willing to pay
the price. But a·re the results worth the
price? We cannot see into the future,
but as far as the Great War is concerned
this is the verdict of history: the demor-
alization which the Russian Army suf-
fered in the two Brussilov offensives
through its enormous losses and the dis-
appointment after its high-strung hopes
was the direct cause of Russia's collapse.
Mter the first Brussilov offensive the
Tsarist regime broke down; after the
second came the Bolshevist Revolution.
Just as the Russian soldiers were
beginning to realize their losses and to
recover from the intoxication of Keren-
sky's oratory, the Germans, on July 19,
opened their counteroffensive at Zborov.
From that moment on, the initiative in
the east was again with the Germans,
and it did not leave them till the end of
the war. Within an hour the Russian
troops were in flight. The entire southern
front started to fall back. Within a
fortnight all the gains of Brussilov's
offensive of 1916 were lost. By August
1, the Russian troops had been pushed
out of Galicia Exactly three years to
the day after the start of the war, the
might of the Russian Army was def-
initely broken.
On the same day, Kerensky dismissed
Brussilov. His successor I at the head of
a counterrevolutionary army, marched
on Petrograd. This attempt failed, and
he in turn was replaced by Dukhonin.
Chaos reigned. The Russian people were
not going to stand for it much longer.
The stage was set for the Bolsheviks.
VOTING WITH LEGS
"The Army voted for peace with its
legs," Lenin remarked cynically when
in the autumn of 1917 the Russian Army
disintegrated and went home, worn out
after three years of terrible losses in men,
material, and morale.
The army and the people of Russia
~anted peace. The fact that the pro-
visional republican government, which
had taken over after the abdication of
the Tsar, showed its determination to
continue the war, contributed more than
anything el6e to the victory of the Bol-
sheviks on November 7, 1917. At that
time, about a million and a half "leg-
voters"-deserters-were roaming the
country, and about ten million Russian
soldiers were dead, wounded, or captured.
These figures have since been dwarfed
by the unparalleled losses of the Red
Army, which in the present war has lost
about twice that number in half the time.
Nevertheless, the Tsarist Army, which
was neither held together by the iron
terror of Stalin nor supported by the
huge industry built up in the nineteen-
thirties, was finished.
With peace slogans as their most
effective bait, the Bolsheviks had come
into power in Petrograd and a few other
centers. 1£ they wanted to stay and
eventually to dominate the whole country,
they had to fulfill their promise. Nor
had they any interest in continuing the
war. More realistic than the preceding
governments, they had clearly recognized
that the Russian nation in its war against
Germany was bleeding not for itself but
for its Allies. Not that the Bolsheviks
were in principle against war. They had
maintained all along that their goal, the
world revolution, would grow out of wars.
But once they had seized power in Russia,
they had one chief interest: to strengthen
their position and gradually to make it
into the cornerstone of the world rev-
olution. For this they needed peace as
a breathing spell. Hence it was one of
their very first acts when on November 8
the newly formed Soviet Government,
called the Council of People's Commissars,
(which included Lenin as President,
Trotsky as Commissar of Foreign Affairs,
and Stalin as Commissar for National
Minorities) issued a decree offering pea.ee:
The Workers' and P688llnta' Government pro-
poses to all belligerent nations and their govern-
ments to commences immediately negotiations for
an equitable and democratic peace. An equitable
and democratic peace is an immediate peace with-
out annexation. that is, without the seizure of
foreign lands, without the forcible annexation of
foreign nationalities, and without the payment oC
indemnities.
THE ALLIES' REACTION
For the moment this was no more
than a rhetorical phrase which was lost
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in the excitement of the first news about
the Revolution and which received no
answer. However, the matter was taken
up again, and this time more definitely,
by Trotsky on November 21 when he
addressed his first formal note to the
diplomatic representatives of the Allied
nations in Petrograd. After informing
the ambassadors of the formation of the
Soviet Government, he called their at-
tention to the above-mentioned decree of
November 8 and added :
1 have the honor to request ;)'ou to consider this
cIooUJnellt aa a formal propoeal for an immediate
Mmilltioe on all fronte llnd the immoo.late openinjt
01 peece negotiRtions. with which proJ>OlllLl the
plenipotentiary Government of the RUlI8ian Re-
publil' appeals simultaneously to all the warring
peopltl'l Rnd their goverwnent.e.
At the same time General Dukhonin
was ordered to conclude an armistice.
The telephone conversation between Gen-
eral Dukhonin at the Russian Head-
quartersatthefront and Lenin, Stalin,and
Krylenko in P~trograd took place in the
amall hours of November 22 and lasted
for two and a hall hours. When the
General refused to comply, he was told
that he W88 di8Charged. Krylenko took
his place, and Dukhonin was later mur-
dered.
The possibility of the RU88ians con-
cluding peace with. the Central Powers
W88 a terrible shock to the Allies. Then,
88 today, they wanted at all costa to
keep Russia in the war. They had not
hesitated to sacrifice the Tsar when he
had proved too weak to continue the
war. They had supported the republican
government. Now the Bolsheviks were
spoiling everything. Win.~ton Churchill,
then Secretary for Munitions, summarizes
the desperate situation of the Allies at
that time: "RU88ia down, Italy gasping,
France exhausted, the British Army bled
white, the U-boats not yet defeated, and
the United States three thousand miles
away." (PM World Crisis, Vol.II,
p.404.)
The Allies immediately turned on all
available pressure to force Russia to con-
tinue the war. Shipments of supplies to
Russia, contracted for by the Russian
Ambassador in the USA, were stopped.
The United States even went 80 far as
to interfere in internal Russian affairs
when the American Ambassador, David
R. Francis, printed and distributed thou-
sands of copies of a statement in which
he tried to incite the Russians to further
war efforts. The Russians and the Bol-
sheviks were constantly reminded by the
Allied representatives that in the Pact of
London of September 5, 1914, they had
promised to fight side by side with the
Allies till final victory.
TROTSKY'S DIALECTICS
But trust the Bolsheviks to find a
"dialectical" way out. Trotsky iImocent-
ly declared that all his government
desired was a general peace. That is
why he had invited the Allies to peace
talks in the decree of November 8 and
the note of November 21. H the Allies
did not even bother to answer these
appeals, it was just too bad for them.
Whether the Bolsheviks really wanted
a general peace or not is hard to tell.
On the one hand, they had a chance of
strengthening their bargaining position
at the peace conference if negotiations
were carried on between all the bellig-
erents, including the Allies. On the
other hand, it was in the interest of the
world revolution that the war continue
beyond the frontiers of Russia until the
rest of the world was equally ripe for
the revolution. We are inclined to think
that Trotsky's insistance on general peace
negotiations came more from a desire on
the part of the Bolsheviks to establish
an alibi for their breach of the London
Pact than from a desire to restore peace.
Meanwhile, Trotsky hRd begun to pub.
lish the secret treaties among the Allies
in order to win over public opinion in
the Allied countries for the Russian peace
drive by exposing the "war for democra-
cy" and the treaties in aU the nakedness
of their greedy and imperialistic char-
acter.
The reaction of the Central Powers to
the Bolsheviks' suggestion for peace was
very different from that of the Allies.
Both the German Chancellor and the
Austrian Prime Minister declared in their
respective diets their governments' readi-
ness to hold peace talks -along the lines
outlined by the Bolsheviks, not only with
Rossia but with all the Allies. They
suggested December 2 as the date for
the opening of the negotiations and
Brest-Litovsk, the headquarters of the
German commander in chief on the
eastern front, as the place.
This wa-s one of the most fateful mo-
ments during tho Great War. Tho des-
tiny of the world hung in the balance.
Had the Allies accepted, the world might
have had peace a year earlier and prob-
ably a much better peace than it was to
receive at Versailles. In 1917 it would
still have be<.'n a negotiated pea{)e, not
one dictated, as in 1919, by shortsighted
hatrcd and desire for revenge.
"LITRUA..YfAN BREST"
Where one of the miIwny lines botwcen
Berlin and Moscow crosses the Ri ycr
Bug, lay Brest, one of the Tsar's mnin
fortresscs. It was an old commercial
center, lmown in the chronicles of Eastern
Europe since tho eleventh century. In
the fourteenth century it came under the
then powerful state of Lithuania and
became one of its leading cities. Later
it became part of Pola.nd, and finally of
Russia. But, in order to distinguish it
from other towns of the same name, it
kept tho name of Brest·Litovsk, that is
"Lithuanian Brest."
Here, on December 2, ]917, in the
afternoon (the Russians, of course, arrived
three a,nd a half hours late at the point
were they were to cross the front) the
first meeting was opened. Both sides
agreed that, with no answer received
from the Allies, the negotiations should
be carried on between the Central Powers
Hnd Russia alone. The Bolsheviks then
asked for a truce, not yet an armistice.
(The negotiations at Brost were to pass
through three stages-truce, armistice,
and poace.) The truco was agreed upon
on DAcember 5 and was to last till De-
cember 17. It was a generous truce, con-
I'idering the state of affairs in Russia: the
Russian troops kept their arms; both
!lides remained where they were standing;
and t.he Cerlllans e,en agl'€,,cd not to
move any anny units larger than a.
division. The delega.tes were to meet
again on December 12.
The stage was now set for one more of
Trotsky's appeals to the Allies. He in·
formed the Allies thll.t the negotiations
at Brest had been suspended at the
initiative of the Russian delegation in
order to give the Allies a chance to partic-
ipate and he asked thorn:
to oxpress their readiness or refusal to participate
in tho negotiations for an armistioe and peaco. and
in C8B6 of a refWlll1 openly to state1:ofore the
world. clearly. definitely. and correctly, in the
name of what purpo80 the people of Europe must
shed their blood during the fourth year of tho war.
Again there was no answer.
THE AR~IISTfCE
The negotiations in Brest were resumed
on December 13. They moved quickly.
An armistice was agreed upon. It was
to last, not six months as the Bolsheviks
had asked, but £rom noon, December 17,
to January 14 and then continue auto-
matically unless one week's notice were
given by either side. Meanwhile, both
sides were to negotiate with a view to
the establishment of peace. The Rus-
sians, still anxious not to increase the
tension with tho Allies more than was
absolutely necessary, asked the Cermans
not to move their troops from the eastern
to tho western £rant, and the CernlR.DB
agreed to this for the duration of the
armistice. The exchange of civilian and
military prisoners was also provided for.
One week later, on December 22 at
4.24 p.m., the peace conference proper
began.
THE SITU.-'TfON
The Reds were in a desperate position.
The Russian Army had cea.sed to func-
tion. The "Red Army" or, ns it was
then called, the "Red Guard," which was
to play its role later in the civil war and
against Allied intervention, had not yet
been built up. Thus thore was nothing
to prevent a furthor German advance.
Moreover, eivil war had started within
Russia. In the south tho antirevolu-
tionary forces were rallying around some
Tsarist generals. It was obvious that
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Russia needed peace at any price. The
only question was: what price would the
Central Powers ask 1
The Central Powers, Germany in partic-
ular, had two chief considerations in
mind. The first was that for three and
a half years they had been fighting a
huge war in order to achieve a real
peace. As Russia's allies had ignored
the peace conference and fighting con-
tinue~ allover Western and Southern
Europe, the Central Powers were forced
to consider the treaty terms not only
from the point of view of peace with
Russia but also from the point of view
of continuing the war against Russia's
allies. Germany was fully aware of the
fact that these allies were doing their
utmost to sabotage the establishment of
peace in Eastern Europe. It was even
possible that the Allies would succeed in
overthrowing the Bolshevist Government,
and that the next Russian government
would renounce the peace treaty and
resume the war.
The second fa.ct which the Central
Powers had to take into consideration
wu that in Brest they were not dealing
with a national Russian government or
even with Russian revolutionaries, but
rather with an international gang, the
majority of whom were Jews and who
admittedly used Russia only as the
jumping-off place for the world revolu-
tion, with the Central Powers next on
their list. Unlike today, Germany was
at that time already experiencing internal
difficulties owing to her confused domestio
policy, not to mention Austria, which
was undergoing a considerable crisis.
There was, in fact, unrest in all countries
involved in the war. To keep Bol-
shevism as far a.way from Europe as
. possible was the duty of every European
statesman and soldier, and lay in the
interest not only of the Central Powers
but oertainly of Europe as a whole. To
evacuate the occupied territories meant
to abandon them to Bolshevization and
civil war. (That is exactly what hap-
pened a year later when the Central
Powers collapsed and their armies re-
turned home. The time was even to
come, in the spring of 1919, when the
Allies themselves had to commission
German troops under General von der
Goltz to aid the Latvians against tho
Reds !)
DRAMATIS PERSONAE
The men representing the two sides
were as different as the ideas for which
they stood.
On the side of the Central Powers were
men of ancient, noble lineage, loyal and
disciplined servants of their crowned
lords, patriotic representatives of their
nations.
The Bolsheviks were professional rev-
olutionaries with long criminal records,
jailbirds who had fought a lifetime for
the overthrow of any existing order.
They had been tossed up by the wave of
the Revolution, many of them soon to be
swallowed up by the next wave. Rep-
resenting a nation which, to most of
them, was foreign from a racial point of
view, they had no interest in Russia
except as a tool toward world revolution.
The men who were .to represent the
Central Powers in the peace negotiations
at Brest-Litovsk were: Richard von
KUhlmann, Secretary of State of the
German Empire and head of the German
delegation at Brest, an experienced career
diplomat who had been Ambassador to
Constantinople in 1916; Count Ottocar
Czernin, the cultured Austrian Foreign
Minister; Talaat Pasha, the Grand Vizier
of the Sultan; and Mr. Popov, the Bul-
garian Minister of Justice.
However, the delegation of the Central
Powers was dominated by the powerful
personality of Major General Max Hoff-
mann, Prince Leopold's ohief of staff,
whom the Prince had entrusted to act
on his behalf. As the commander of the
fortress which he had rebuilt from the
ruins of 1915, he was the host of all the
delegations (a grand total of more than
400 persons!). One of the ablest German
generals, he had a head that reminded
his contemporaries of Bismarck's. More-
over, he was a specialist on Russian
affairs. He had been an observer on the
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Russian front during the Russo-Japanese
War, he was familiar with the Russian
language, and the destruction of the two
Russian armies in East Prussia in 1914
was based partly on his knowledge of the
fact that their two commanders were
personal enemies.
General Hoffmann was a realist.
When, following the first Bolshevist peace
offer, Ludendorff had skeptically asked
him over the telephone: "Can we
negotiate with such people?" Hoffmann
had answered without hesitation: "Yes,
we can negotiate. Your Excellency needs
the troops. And the Bolsheviks are the
first to ask for peace."
The chairman of the Bolshevist delega-
tion was Adolf Joffe (Jewish), with Leo
Karakhan (Armenian) as secretary. Among
the other members, Leo Kamenev-Rosen-
feld (Jewish, Trotsky's brother-in-law),
Gregory Sokolnikov-Brilliant (Jewish),
and Karl Radek-Sobelsohn (Jewish),
stood out. For "show," the delegation also
included a worker, a peasant, a sailor, and
a woman, Madame Bitsenko, who had been
in Siberia for murder. The dominating
figure on the Soviet side was Leo Trotsky-
Bronstein (Jewish), the ForeignCommissar,
although he was only present during
part of the negotiations. Incidentally, all
these Bolshevik luminaries, with the ex-
ception of Joffe, who seems to have died
a natural death, have since become the
victims of Stalin's megalomania. Trotsky
was murdered in his Mexico refuge by
one of Moscow's agents; the others, in-
cluding the ex-commander in chief, Kry-
lenko, were all involved in the famous
Moscow trials of 1936 to 1938.
The Bolsheriks, being professional rev-
olutionaries who knew nothing of mili-
tary affairs, had brought with them some
Tsarist officers as experts. One of them
shot himself the first evening after he
had observed the depressing contrast
between the delegates who represented
his Russia and those of the Central
Powers.
Even though the delegates of the
Central Powers may not have been aware
of it, they were facing unscrupulous
criminals whose one aim was to destroy
them and everything that they held dear
in European civilization.
There was one more difference between
the two delegations. The Reds were
interested in dragging out the negotia-
tions as long as possible (on condition
that fighting did not resume), hoping that
the Revolution might meanwhile spread
to the rest of the world. The Central
Powers, however, wanted to come to
terms as quickly as possible in order to
turn all their strength against their
enemies in the west.
THE FOURTEE~ POINTS
At the start of the peace talks on
December 22, the victorious Central Pow-
ers agreed to the Bolsheviks' suggestion
to calTY out the negotiations in public
(in glaring contrast to the secret procedure
at Versailles). The preliminaries were
quickly settled. On December 28 the
negotiations reached the territorial ques-
tion. General Hoffmann told the Bol-
sheviks thq.t they should not expect to
get any of the territories lost in the war.
Now the Allied representatives in Pet-
rograd saw their last chance for bringing
the Reds back into the war. The dele-
gate of the American Committee of Public
Information wired to America on January
3, suggesting that President Woodrow
Wilson make an anti-imperialistic speech
in favor of democratic peace in order to
reassure the Russians and perhaps to
sow discord in the camp of the Central
Powers. The result of this suggestion
was the notorious Fourteen Points which
Wilson incorporated in hi~ speech of
January 8. Thus the Fourteen Points,
which were later to have such a fatal
influence on the trusting German nation,
were originally a clever ruse intended for
the Russians.
THE EASTERN EUROPEAN BELT
When the negotiations were resumed
on January 9, Trotsky appeared as head
of the Bolshevist delegation. His pro-
vocative impertinence was even harder
to bear by the gentlemen of the Central
Powers than the oily insincerity of
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Joffe. From now on, the fight centered
around the fate of the Eastern European
belt, that is, the western border areas of
the former Tsarist empire.
The Eastern European belt, a large
part of which had been conquered by the
German armies, is not Russian in the
true sense of the word. Finland had
been incorporated into the empire of the
Tsars in 1809, Estonia and half of Latvia
(known Il8 Livonia) in 1721, Lithuania
and the other half of Latvia (called
Courland) in 1795, White Ruthenia, Po-
land and the Ukraine west of the Dniepr
in the years 1772 to 1795. The Finns.
Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians are
Jlot even Slavs. The Poles, although
Slavs, are bitter enemies of the Russians
and have fought in Ulany violent revolts
against their subjection by Russia. The
White Ruthenians and the Ukrainians
are ethnologica.\l) close to the Russians,
but both, particularly the Ukrainians,
possess a long tradition of struggle for
independence from Moscow.
At ~he time when the negotiatiun'
began at Brest, the German troop held
a line slightly to the east of the winter
line of 1915/16. Thus, properl)' peakinfl',
they stood nowhere on Russian soil. Iu
their demand that the Bolsheviks give
up claw to the occupied areas, the Ger-
mans declared that they did not intend
to annex these areas and, furthermore,
that the peoples of the border areas had
unequivocally expressed their will to
secede. The Germans could point to the
following proofs.
THE 'VUL TO SEOEDE
Finland. Estonia, and Latvia had pro-
claimed their complete independence from
Russia on July 20, September 21. and
November 28, 1917, respectively. Lithua-
nia had on September 23, established a
National Council with her formal declara-
tion of independence soon to follow. In
Poland, Germany and Austria had pro-
claimed an independent Polish kingdom
on November 5, 1916; and a. Polish Coun-
cil of State, of which Pilsudski was a.
member, had adopted a new Polish con-
stitution. And the Ukraine, after the
fall of the Tsarist Government in tht'
spring of 1917, had formed her own
government, the "Rada." In July she
obtained autonomy from the Russian
Provisionn,l Government, and after the
Bolshevist Revolution the Ukrainian
Democratic Republic was proclaimed in
Kiev. Incidenta.Ily, the Bolsheviks them-
selves had granted the peoples of Russia
the right to secede (although they opposed
its practical application in every case).
mSTORICAL LOGIC
The Bolsheviks, of course, declared
that, in seceding from Russia, the govern-
ment!' of the bOl'der areas were acting
only under pressure of the Central Powers.
That this wa!' not truc can be clearly
proved today:
First, neither in Finland nor Estonia
nor the Ukraine were there any soldiers
of the Central Powers when these coun-
tries declared their independence from
Russia. Secondly, the border countries
remained independent even after the
collapse of the Central Powers. The sale
exception wa!' the 1 kraine. where the
Bolsheyiks. after a bitter ci"il war. suc-
ceeded in restoring their powcr by forcc.
No, the secession of the burtler area;.
from Russia was not a German trick bllt
a spontaneolls act on the pal·t of their
peoples and also an act of historical
logic. The old Russian Empire had been
held together, not by ethnographic bonds,
but by the fact that all its parts had the
same ruler, the "White Tsar." \Vheu
the Revolution destroyed the monarchy
and its army, the centrifugal forces within
the empire came to the fore. Even the
Ii beral Frankfurter Zeitu.ng wrote :
That which tho RlIllllilln Go\'emment is now
gi\'ing up hILS not beon taken from it by tho Central
Powers; it hIlS detached itself in the course of ....
procos.q which would probllbly have been set in
motion by the same Revolution. oven without this
war. A RIISRia thut has renounced t,he imperialism
of the Tsnrist empire need not regard the secession
of her outer areas as a mutilation.
The Bolsheviks' loud insistence on sclf-
(leterlllination sounded particularly gro-
tesque in view of their own record: they
had unleashed a regime of bloody terror
in Finland. Estonia, and Livonia; they
1'7' THE XXtb CENTURY
had overthrown by force of arms t.he
government which the White Ruthenians
had established in Minsk; they had
invaded the Ukraine after acknowledging
her independence, and they had chased
the Constituent .Assembly, elected after
their revolution, out of Petrograd because
it was not in their favor.
The German contention that the border
areas wished of their own accord to be
free from Bolshevist rule was greatly
strengthened when a delegation from the
Ukrainian Rada arrived in Brest. The
Bolsheviks were, of course, highly dis-
pleased, but the Ukrainians answered: It
was you Bolsheviks who appealed to all
belligerent nations to participate in this
conference, a,nd here we are, though a
little late.
Trotsky was caught and saw himself
forced on January 9 to recognize the
delegation's authority to speak in the
name of an independent Ukra.ine. From
now on the negotiations with the Ukrain-
ians and the Bolsheviks proceeded side
by side. This fact provided the German
diplomats with a valuable talking point
against the Reds.
TROTSKy'S TJlXATRIOAL COUP •.•
The negotiations between the Central
Powers and the Ukraine were a heavy
blow to the Bolsheviks. Trotsky hurried
to Petrograd. Before a meeting of the
Central Committee of the Party he
pleaded for the negotiations to be dragged
out without concluding peace, hoping
that something might happen to better
the situation. Lenin, who was more
realistic, advocated early peace. The
Bolsheviks, he argued, needed peace as a
breathing spell in order to strengthen
their position in Russia. He reiterated
an idea expressed in the official Soviet
daily, lzvfstiya, on November 25: "There
is no peace at the expense of Russia that
would be worse than a war at the expense
of Russia." But for the time being
Trotsky won; to the disadvantage, as it
later turned out, of the Bolsheviks.
With Trotsky back in Brest, negotia-
tions were resumed on January 30. But
while Trotsky was proud of hie 8Uooo88
in protracting the negotiationa, the Cen-
tral Powers used the time well and, on
February 9, signed a peace treaty with
the Ukraine, the first peace treaty of the
Great War. They recognized the Ukrain-
ian Republic and delimited its western
frontier. Brest-Litovsk itself came with-
in its borders.
Trotsky now realized that his tactics
were getting him nowhere. He also saw
that there was no chance of obtaining
the border areas. He decided to stage a
theatrical coup. On February 10, Kara-
khan telephoned to Petrograd. Stalin was
on the wire. Karakhan told him of
Trotsky's plan. Stalin gave his O.K.
In the session of that day, Trotsky
declared dramatically: "We are out of
the war, but we refu8C to sign a peace
treaty."
Trotsky's "No war-no peace" policy,
although sensational, was neither logical
nor practical. It was an action typical
of Trotsky. It pleased his vanity to
have created an uproar in the world.
Beyond that it is hard to imagine what
benefit Trotsky expected for his side
from this coup. Berlin, of course, con-
sidered his declaration as notice of the
end of the armistice.
. . .•!ND ITS RESULT
Observing the week's term agreed on
in the armistice, the German Army reo
commenced its advance on February 1Ii
at noon sharp. If perchance Trotsky
had hoped that the German troops might
refuse to fight, he had badly miscalculated.
The German Army rose like ono man and
its war machine started rolling without 1\
hiteh. The Bolsheviks themselves had
by now succeeded in completely dis-
organizing the Russian Army. Without
opposition the Germans marched east-
ward, greeted in Livonia and Estonia as
liberators from intolerable Red terror.
On February 16, the Ukrainian ROOa
asked the Central Powers to free the
Ukrainian Republic from the Bolshevist
invaders-who had captured Kiev after a
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merciless bombardmen~while at the
same time addressing the civilized world
by wireless :
To aDl Do not believe Bolshevism! Do not
believe itt It i.e nothing but a ID88k and & hypo.
eritioal pretextl Do not look at words, look only
at the deeda of the Bolsheviks in our country! In
Kiev, Kharkov, Poltava, and other cities of the
UlaaiDe murder and incendiari.em are rampant;
evwybocly i.e being pel'lleCUted by the Red Guard,
is beiDg chued out of the ho~ and shot down.
Natione of the world, do you know what it meana
to have & Bolaheviat. government? Spread thi.e
appeal, if )'011 are the friends of true inledom, and
...s it into aD thOlle countries in which the voice
of tnth aDd freedom i.e not being heard.
The news of the German advance
cauaed a panic in Petrograd. The Cen-
tral Committee met on February 18. At
Int" Lenin's suggestion to ask the Ger-
IIUIoD8 by telegram for peace was narrowly
defeated (6:7) by Trotsky's oratory. But
,when still more alarming news arrived
during the day, the Central Committee
met once more in the evening. This time
Trotsky changed his mind. When the
vote was taken, it was 7:6 for immediate
peace. Among those who voted in its
favor were Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin.
LDDi'S ULTDIATUM
on tile following morning the Boishe-
via' 1WdineiiI to sjgn peace was broad-
out. While the uunver from Berlin was
still on its ,way and the German armies
were advancing, the Omtr.al Committee
met again. In the general panic, Trotsky
BUggeBted asking the Allies for aid.
Lenin, who could not be present at the
meeting, ~nt a slip of paper with a
message scribbled on it :
Plea~ add my vote in favor of accepting
IUpf10rl and armie8from the Anglo-French
imptf'iGli8t bandits. Lenin.
Of course this vote had not the slightest
influence on the course of events. Yet
Lenin's cynical words reveal his attitude
to~ard the Allies. Stalin has always
claimed to be a loyal follower of Lenin.
In this point he very likely is.
The terms arrived from Berlin on
February 23. In a meeting of the Cen-
tral Committee, Lenin demanded their
acceptance. Enough harm had been done
by wasting time in empty talk. The
"policy of revolutionary phrases" had to
be dropped, Lenin declared in a moment
of outspokenness. Then he offered an
ultimatum: Either the Central Com-
mittee voted for peace or he would resign.
Some of the members spoke vehemently
against peace. Finally, a vote was taken
on the question: "Shall we accept the
German terms immediately?" As the
vote was linked with Lenin's ultimatum,
its result was a foregone conclusion.
There were seven votes in favor, among
them Lenin's and Stalin's. There were
four "no's," while the remaining four,
among them Trotsky, refraIned from
voting.
THE TREATY
On Febru&.1'Y 28 the Bolshevist delega-
tion arrived in Brest. Trotsky was not
a member. From the Central Powers,
too, only second-rank men had come.
On March 1 the first meeting was held.
The Allies, while talking of aid, gave
none. The Treaty was signed on March
3, and the chief provisions were briefly
as follows:
Article 1. The war i.e over. Peace and friend·
ship ahall reign between the signatoriee.
Article 2. Neither side is to conduct any prop·
aganda against the government, the etate in·
lItitutiona. or the army of the other parly.
Article 3. Rusaia renounooe her sovereilJIlty over
the areas weet of & certain line (i.e., Poland, Lithua.
nia, Courland). The final frontier line i.e to be
detAmnined by a mixed Qennan-Ru88ian oom·
mi8aion. The Bo1shevika are to refrain from any
interference in the internal affairs of the 1,* areas.
Germany and Austria·Hungary are to determine
the future of this territory in agreement with its
peoples.
.Article.. Gennany i.e to evacuate the ocoupied
areaa after the conclusion of & general peace and
the completion of Russian demobilization. The
RusailUlll are to evacuate areae occupied in Turkey
as well as some districts on the Turkish border.
Article 5. The RUBBian Anny is to be demo-
bilized, the RU88ian Navy to return to Russian
ports. The Baltic and the Black Seas are to be
cleared of mines. and trade resumed.
Article 6. RU8IliB acknowledges the peace
treaty between the Central Powel'll and the Ukrain·
ian Republic. She promille8 also to conclude peace
with the Ukraine and to evacuate her territory.
The bord.er toward Estonia and Livonia i.e fixed.
(That toward Estonia corresponded about to the
one which later exi.eted in the twentillB and thirties.
that toward Livonia W8B more favorable to the
Soviets than the one which emerged after Ver.
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sailles.) GormAn police are to remain there wltil
tho two peopl ha\'o organized their own 10 aJ
aut horities.
HU88ia renoun her claim to FinJand and th
Aaland Islands, (!\othinjr i. lillid about the futur
relationshill belwoon Hussia. on tho one hand,
....inland. Estoniu.. Li\'ollia. and the Ukrlline on
tho other. in coni rBst to Poland. Lithullnin. Mill
('omland which, ucoordill~ to Arl;<,le 3. were clef,
initely rcl&l\Sed froln HII ~iun 8O\'ereignty.)
Article 7. Doth ~illt'S ,,"knowledge the in·
<1<,pendenee und territoriBI illlcgri y of l'cr~ill nnd
Aip:hR.lli tUII,
Arti Ie ' Pri Oil£' of wnr ure to 110 allow to
return to their lI(\ti\'o cOllntrie",
Article n, ~u wflr IIld('mnity i; 10 1>0 pill.
A"licle 10: lIiplollllltic' nnJ c' II ular relntiollJl
1\1'1' 1.0 he rO-<Il,n"lI.
Article II. HOglIl'llilli( p"ollomic relntion II
ereci,,1 ugroe.1110111 tl"nl'0rurily IHkes tho pln"o of
tho l:erman,Hu.•j"ll trndo tr£'atie of If;tQ,I\l1l4,
tl,c finn I urrfllllwmcnl 10 h(' lnaJe \\ IIl'll normnl
('nnditions nre 'l"C!llorcd.
nieles 12 to 1-1 ("lIll"ro 1C<'III,i,·"litics of th'·
I ro ty.
In an Ilrlditi"nal tre'ah' I'ach >:idf'
ngreed tn r('plnC'I' damage'S >:;ltTt'rl'd within
it" frontj('J'''; I,,· til<' nat,innal" of th ' othlr
purt." in "ioln'tion of intcrllati"llnl III\\'.
:\ (:EH\1.\~ ,"I'\TE\IE~T
Thi:, wa." th' famulI" tl'f'llty of HI' ,t-
Litu\'f'k, It h· .. in 'C been subject to II
good dcal of denunciation. 010 ·tty by
peopl with ulterior motin's and hy
tho. e who hn \'L' not tll ken the t.J'()U ble t(,
I' ad it, W' \'('lIture ttl pI' diet thnt
future wst rinul-i will du more jwtiC'(' tn
the trf'at\' 01lC'\' it hAS (,€'l1-<Pc\ til h( II
foubjcc ~f hell ted alld preju(lic'd eon-
t1'0n;'r,,\', III \'il"\' of th(' nature of
HlJl:,lte~'isll1 a" w(' han' l'OIllt' to know it
II,' now th y will et:rtainlv not. e\ailllt1~at the'troat,v \\'/Hl too lellj~nt, IUHl that
(:crmany l-iho'nld lilt HI deli vered IIIore
people up to tlw I{ell t ITOI'.
JIl a 1llt'lllon1nd 11111 presented to t hc
R ·jrh;:ta rr on ~fflrch Ii. 1!1I .. th(' (: rn\1\ll
('haneellor l"uid abollt this trcaty :
It is II pea' without annexalion; Ih territori
whi"h HIIssil\ rei"", frum her 80\'01' ignt.v will
1I0t he plnced IIn<lor I h so\'ereil:(Uty of Itor formor
opponents; in.• t(Jllti. t.Ic'ir futuro form of govern,
mellt i" to be docido I in ngrCOlnent with t,he poopl~.
It is 11 pOllce withoul contriuuliollJ; \"1m tlco now
Ilr"nt sacrifico fOrl'l'llu[lOn (lormany anti her oUiell
hy tho senseI S l'l'Sislnn"o hy tltose in pow r in
HII in (i.e., aftt'r Tro ky' I'oup). Its\' not loci to
a war indemnity being imposed upon t.he RlI.an
people. Tho a CClllIOI")' treaties of an economic
and legal.poli tica I nat.ure are founded on equality
and reciprocalily; they contain nothing but. an
execution of whot was prepared and brou~ht nearly
10 the point of ngt'('('ment in tho socond lltage of
Iho negotiations [i,o.. between December 22 And
February 10).
Moreovor. til fod that Ihe German ultimatulll
ga\'o tho HII..'<ilian delegation only three da~' ill
which 10 oncllldQ the no~otil1tioU8 does not rop,
resent cool'i n: wilh Iho exception of a few of
Ihe point of tho ultimatum. for th sot.llomtmt of
t<'hich this lerm was more than onoul(h. all [lOint.~
contained in Ihe drafts presented by tll ntral
I'ot<'ers had been thoroughly di cu' cd in w kg
of parleys wilh tl,o Hw ian del~ales, Tho rc-~ult
of tho disf'U&liOl • 1I."'lCrnbled !J\' tho <..: r1nllll
Co\'et·nmont. 11lId heen in the ha";d~ of tho nus,
. ion (:o\'omll'ont 8ill"0 tho end of JlIlltlary. Tt
was II0W 8illlpl~' (L Inuttnl' of c1ecidini( whoth r to
lll'l'ept tho," ur "·jod 1.1'011" In proper "N'o~nil,ion
of the poli! ienl situnt ion in which th<l Htls3ion
l;CO\'ernlll('IIt hnd 1'I'Iced itself, th I"ltc,' cho;<o to
Il""ept,
Tlw,(' \\'l)rd", I '''oid of any :ign.· of that.
much trllmp(·d-llp '(:erman impC'riali;:m,"
"how that the C:c rll1all GO'7(,l'I1lnent ('nr-
I1c"th' ('Ildeu n)J'(~d to lay the fOllndation,.;
for ;~ gcnllim' peace, ~ot rcalizing that
with BoLhc\'ism a crenuine pence Wfl. Ollt.
of t.he q nest ion.
CROCODILF. TEA R,'
The Allie' ill particular ,hI' I llIany a
crocodile t r O\'Cl' the illjlL-.;tiec ",hi h
their poor ullil':-i, tht' Bol"he"jk~. al It-gerl I.,'
had to "ufl'CI' thrulIgh the treaty of Brl'st-
Lito\',;)" y.t, wit 'n, after the collu.p,.;c of
C;ermuny. til(' :\lIie' were ill the' :uj)r'llll'
po:,itioll f I eill' aIle tv redraw th' map
vf Europe whi('he'-er way they liked.
t hey left t hi' 111 in pro\·ision.., of the
tl'f'aty unehulIg('(l: they retlu'ncd neither
Estonia. Lah-in, Lithuania, 11M Poland
to Ru;:sin.
\\'ith the C'onelll::iioll of tho treaty the
(:ennnn:-i stl1ppe I their ad\':lllu' illto
Rus:-'ia, Onh' in the (ikraine. who,,('
indepcndene . tho Bol"hc\'iks thl'lI1s h'e",
had rccognized, an army consi ting of
L"krainian \" Iuntecrs, Ukrainian ex-prjs-
onen; of war. and C:ermans, continued
to march. \\ ithin two month", this
:ll'll1y rid th entire (kraine of the Bol-
~h{',·iks. The ca:ternmost line I'oachod
by t.he Gorman forc ~ i shown in our
map.
.U-rER BRlJSSlLOV C.-\)I.E THE EXD
The fact that the treaty of March 3
(including as it did the loss of Livonia,
Estonia, and Finland) was harder t.han
the peace conditions had been prior to
'.l)oteky's stunt of February 10 was the
fault of Trotsky and, to some extent, of
Stalin, who gave his assent to it. Lenin
had been in favor of signing pea,ce ever
since January 22.
The question remains: Was it a wise
Ulon ou·the part of Germa.ny to conclude
~ With the Bolsheviks? The leading
participator at Brcst-Litovsk.
Ge~eralHoffmann, became very doubtful
about the wisdom of the treaty soon
after it had been concluded. He de-
clared that it would have been better to
pcIlitmme the offensive in the west, to
march to Petrograd and M08COW, to end
• 'bloody regime of tho Bolsheviks, to
~ a RU88ian national government into
power. to conclude with this government
A.mOre favorable peace than that granted
fAa 'the Bolsheviks, returning large parts
of .,~ lost at Brest·Litovsk, and
... this n,w RU88ia an ally of
, • Tms. ~ maintained, would
.. BaIIIIiA untold misery and
I', " Of ,mjllions of people, and
~ .hfidilced tile Allies too to
~ - •........,., ...:..... G (Der~"'r - ~ "',.",..., ~y£' I!Jt Q~t1I, pp.
. :fttl:1'h. theee~ came too
"te, ~e1 reveal'. itl ·1118. tight 'w am
present/knowledge, arem&rkable. ,political
fQ1'esight. The trouble 'with ''the leaders
of, the Central Powers and of Europe in
pJleioal in the winter of 1917J18 was that
tBy, did not know Bolsheviam as the
~ wu to know it during the fo11ow-
Dfi feUI·
'..~a OFFER THEIR HEART
~ treaty still needed the ratification
of f. ~tractmg parties. The .Allies,
of'~; mJilrigued 88 best they could
~ it. They were all for the Rus-
siAna- &ghtiDg-they even offered Krylen-
ko 100 rubles for every Russian soldier
"'hom he could persuade to fight-but
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they were not in the lCl1st willing to do
an~'thing themselvc8.
At the YII Communist Pa,rty Congress
(~Iar('h 6-S, 191fl) Lenin won after a. hard
verbal tussle. The vote was 28:9 (one
abstention) in favor of ratification. The
Congress of the Soviet,., the highest state
organ of Soviet Russia, convened on March
14-16. While it was in session, President
Wilson made a lust-minute appeal:
"The whole heart of the people of the
ellit(~d States is with the people of
Rus:,oia in its attempt to free themseh'es
forever from IHltocra.tic government and
become mllstCl'!'1 of their own life." R~ad
todll.y, it sounds almot't likc an appeal of
F. D. Roose,·clt.-s to )!o;;cow or Chung-
king.
But at that timc thc Bolsheviks t'itW
through the Allies' game. Trotsky sclid
to Colonel Robim! of the r\merictl.n Red
Cr088 Mission, who was serving Ill! a
liaison officer betwecn the Boishe"iks and
the American Embassy:
"Colonel Hobin8. YOllr l:mbQ8S;)' llllnllH you here
wilh 0 big hal: marked '..\meri<>IlD help.' YOli
nrrivc {'very day. Rlld you brin~ thE' bftg int.o my
room, /wd ;)'Ou set it down I,esidc your chair, Im,1
you k~'CJl readliug illto it. I.\~ you talk. 011<1 it j., a
powerful bOll, Hut nOlhillJ.( en'" comes oul."
On the second day of t.hc Congress,
Lenin summoned Colond Robins,
"What havc you heard from your
government? ' he asked.
"Nothing," replied Colonel Robins.
"And what have the British heard
from London1"
"Nothing."
Now Lenin made his final speech in
favor of ratification. His resolutioll was
adopted, 784:261. The rat.ification docu-
ments were exchanged on )larch 2lJ.
Thus the Rus8ian na.tion had obtained
peace from heor foreign war. But this
peace meant only the prelude to the
worst catastrophe in aU its history. The
Bolsheviks used t hc peace with the
Ccntral Power's for the complete enslave-
ment of the Russian people.
